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“For all its romantic attractiveness, national heritages and cultural identities – 
Europe remains a banking backwater and bank regulator’s nightmare.” –Michael Burda-  




Access to finance is a critical precondition for growth. In E(M)U, and especially during 
recessions when profit retention or raising new equity proved to be of limited applicability, 
borrowing from banks has turned out to be disturbingly dominant source of finance for more than a 
decade. The ongoing Eurozone crisis merely amplified already ‘smoking’ frictions between national 
legislation and supervision of banks and increasingly international theatre of their operation. Lax or 
ill-suited regulation coupled with weak national supervision of European banks provoked sky-
rocketing levels of public debt build-up, aggravated through recession, making some of the banks so 
systemically risky for certain EMU member governments, that it appears they (national authorities) 
lack fiscal capacity and/or electoral support to solve the banking problems in either way. 
This paper analyses the blueprint for and essential elements of the European Banking Union 
meant to deal with the above described issues in both positive and normative terms. In doing so, we 
shall try to confront and contrast the idiosyncratic shortcomings of the European currency union and 
anatomy of the Eurozone crisis at hand with the aims, instruments and scope of the banking union 
itself. After examining direction of causality between the week national banking sectors and the 
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deteriorating sovereign (public) finances, we go on to rectify both the objectives and design of the 
Eurozone’s banking union. This paper argues that Eurozone’s banking union has been deployed to 
deal with wrong problems equipped with ill-suited tools, which accounts for its early paralysis. 
However, the fact that leading members of the Eurozone hastily passed national legislation which 
exempts their strategically important banks from the outreach of the European Banking Authority 
they themselves have just established, casts doubt that the aforementioned financial polio may 
disguise something much more sinister coming up. 
As a matter of fact, in this paper we claim that even if the current proposal were to be 
mended, Eurozone’s banking union remains a necessary complement, but in no way a stand-alone 
supplement to the quasi-fiscal transfer mechanism to be woven around European Brady bonds issues 
– the latter still imperative for conquering the crisis in/of EMU in its current size, shape and form.  
For better or worse, EBU is a longer term project, not a quick fix to idiosyncratic crisis at hand 
[Dombret-Ebner, 2013].    
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sketches historical, legal and 
macroeconomic background of the EBU blueprint, union proponents’ intentions and mutually 
reinforcing nature of the twin crises which brought it up. Section 3 deals with concerns and problems 
in regard to painfully slow development of the EBU and its current design, finally offering corrective 
answers to what could/should be done in normative and positive sense. Section 4, finally, 
concentrates more deeply on who is going to foot the bill and where could/should the funds come 
from. It also further elaborates on whether EBU on its’ own is enough or has to be launched 
together with quasi-fiscal federalism in order to decisively eliminate the twin crises paradigm. Lastly, 
section 5 offers the main conclusions and some closing thoughts. 
 
2. Historical, legal and macroeconomic background of the EBU blueprint 
The launch of the euro on 1st of January 1999 legalized multispeed EU without introduction 
of necessary changes in authorization and prudential supervision of banks (and other institutions for 
financial intermediation) headquartered in the Eurozone’s member states. Obviously, creation of the 
common currency by and in itself temporarily solidified the capital/monetary aspect of the Single 
(internal) market and unleashed cross-border European banking operations ever so forcefully. On 
the other hand, differentials in credit riskiness perceived among different member states disappeared 
into thin air after introduction of the euro as they were not reflected in massively converging interest 
rates quoted for sovereigns and to the lesser extent everybody else beneath. Both developments have 
had an enormous mutually reinforcing impact on the dynamics of European banks’ liquidity and 
intertwined indebtedness as well as on fiscal sustainability of EMU’s members, soon giving rise to the 
so-called twin-crises which have been tormenting the Eurozone to this very day.  
Twin-crises in theory are recognised as episodes of balance-sheet overexposure of banking 
(and in bank-centric Europe also corporate) sector and subsequent inability of the sovereigns to 
credibly abstain from bailing them out. Principal source of corporate and banking sectors’ 
overexposure typically earmarks risky unprofitable investment propped up by moral hazard, cheap 
money and abrupt financial liberalisation  [Malovic, 2006]. Nevertheless, one cannot rule out 
incidents of notorious fiscal profligacy where exploding government debt and state 
instrumentalisation -of leading national (commercial) banks’ lending channels- have endangered their 
solvency.  Thus, coexistence of more or less simultaneous banking and currency or banking and 
sovereign debt crises has been theoretically laid out  in both causal directions, more on which could 
3 | P a g e  
 
be found in, inter alia, Malovic (2006, pp. 44-45). Eurostat’s and ECB’s data as well as anecdotal 
evidence, indeed, also prompt mixed conclusions as to the temporal genesis sequence of one (cause) 
relative to the other (effect).  Italy and Greece, for instance, have had a long history of budget deficits 
and weak public finances eventually spreading the crisis onto their banking sector. France and many 
other EMU members are known of strategic alliances and certain political influence their commercial 
banks are susceptible to. Although econometric evidence in that regard tends to be scarce, it is hard 
to believe that yesterday’s macroeconomic weaknesses and bloated sovereign risk wouldn’t provoke 
cracks in the liquidity shield of the banking sector today, rather than to think that notoriously elusive 
causality probably isn’t sufficiently cleanly pinpointed in the original regressions. Spain and Ireland, 
on the other hand, represent the cases where abundance of cross-border loans ex-ante and sudden-
stop-invoked rescue of their respective banking systems ex-post threatened to bankrupt not only the 
local banks but the Irish and Spanish government themselves. Mody and Sandri (2012), for example, 
empirically prove that stress in the financial sector Granger-causes sovereign spread hike, while 
Aizenman, Binici and Hutchinson (2013) in a dynamic panel estimation find that a credit rating 
upgrade in the EU decreases respective sovereign’s CDS spread by about 45 basis points on average. 
Be that as it may, there is another principal culprit for incidence of twin-crises in the EMU, 
irrespective of bankers’ moral hazard, creation of the euro or expansionary monetary policy: the fact 
that, under Basel 2 rules, holding sovereign bonds for banks bears zero risk reservation weight!  
Gradual dissipation of private safe assets along with fears of after-explosions of toxic assets 
in either banks’ or their clients’ balance sheets and in the end of the day general uncertainty in 
distinguishing between sound and unsound financial intermediaries, all of the above jointly prompted 
European banks to increasingly lend to sovereigns. Initial interest spread spikes followed by the wave 
of downgrading of European sovereigns both owe to the existence of common currency, under 
which individual central banks no longer have control over domestic money creation, which has 
effectively stripped them to emerging markets’ original sin status (De Grauwe, 2011). Nonetheless, 
there still exists essentially no upper regulatory limit on the concentration of sovereign risk in banks’ 
assets [Gros, 2013]. 
On a top of obsolete regulation that made it attractive for banks to hold bundles of 
government debt in their portfolios, too-systemic-to-fail anticipation of sovereign or pan-European 
bail out apparently created a financial plane for carry trade behaviour of internationally active 
European banks since the beggining of the euro crisis. To be fair, majority of German, French and 
Italian banks have always held a considerable fraction of total public debt [Gros, 2013].2 However, 
even after intra-European balance of payments disequilibria became large, apparent and pressing 
matters, both Eurozone’s core and periphery members’ banks appear to have actively managed their 
sovereign bond portfolios by increasing their exposures to GIIPS IOUs in spite of already widening 
yield spreads on sovereign liabilities in period March-December 2010 [Acharya-Steffen, 2013]. Put 
differently, European banks were not taken by surprise with the whole sovereign debt overhang issue 
owing to exposures made prior to Eurozone crisis eruption; they were in fact deliberately fortifying 
their exposures in a herd-like behaviour, lobbying for a bail-out in the process. Hence, for regulatory 
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arbitrage3 and game theoretical reasons, Acharya and Steffen (2013) proved that European banks 
have been, on average, long in GIIPS bonds (especially Spanish), and short in German bunds, which 
is to say that majority of internationally active European banks have been engaged in morally 
hazardous financing of peripheral sovereign debt with short-term borrowing from the EMU’s core 
over better part of the Eurozone crisis span. Only recently this trend has reversed to home biasness 
as Core’s banks retreated to domestic assets4 and many periphery’s banks clinched to their national 
sovereign bonds on an even bigger scale than ever before. 
It is with that historical and macroeconomic heritage that European Banking Union is 
supposed to come into existence. Truth be told, at the onset of the global financial meltdown, the 
only policy tool aimed at safeguarding stability of the European banking system(s), namely a lender 
of last resort function (to solvent banks in dire straits of illiquidity), has been in place only de facto and 
on non-statutory basis [Gortsos, 2012]. Moreover, the less known crisis-driven de Larosiere report 
from 2009, ordered by and drafted for the European Commission, originally advised that it was 
neither necessary nor feasible to set up a supranational supervisory institution for banks and financial 
sector at the E(M)U level. Instead, it proposed a creation of European System of Financial 
Supervisors made of three window-dressed regulatory authorities without any serious supervisory 
“teeth”: a) The European Banking Authority (EBA), b) The European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and c) European Securities and (Financial) Markets Authority (ESMA), 
established and approved by the European Parliament and the Council. Gortsos (2012) rightly claims 
that only after the Greek bankruptcy, the need for EFSF (today’s ESM) has been fully recognised 
along with some supranational resolution authorities for the Eurozone. Even though EFSF/ESM 
was originally envisaged as a fund for supporting over-indebted sovereigns, blatant lobbying of 
banking industry and the ‘communicating vessels’ nature of the twin crises juxtaposed it to pseudo-
resolution fund meant to make up for any funding mismatch between bank liabilities and assets and 
provide direct recapitalization for troubled banks of yet undetermined viability [Malovic-Marinkovic, 
2012]. 5 
Finally, more recent creation of the so-called Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) marked a 
first solid footprint on an explicit road-map to forming the European Banking Union [Veron-Wolff, 
2013]. The latest blueprint for foundation of the European Banking Union, it is believed, should be 
capable of a) putting an end to contagious zombification of European banks as well as of b) untying 
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unfair, since “if unsuccessful in bailing in the banks and exporters- Bundesbank has after all been protecting the interests 
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hit Germany first” [Malovic-Marinkovic, 2013, p.9] . As a corollary, Bundesbank’s exposure (claims) towards the rest of 
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5
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ESM member country [Gros-Schoenmaker, 2012, p.7]. 
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the “diabolical loop” between the bank solvency and fiscal standing of its sovereign [Gros-
Schoenmaker, 2012]. 
Just before or in parallel with the aforementioned institutional kick-offs, ECB has been fire-
fighting the crisis firstly with extra refinancing credit to the tune of €900bn to commercial banks in 
countries worst hit (as measured by its gross payment system known as Target 2), through so-called 
LTROs (long term refinancing operations) and afterwards through the more blunt OMTs (outright 
monetary operations). Unsatisfactory effect of the European version of quantitative easing (QE) bore 
resemblance with the US counterpart in as much as the banks that are stronger appeared to had been 
hoarding cash. Twofold outcome was another round of liquidity squeeze, yet with an encouragement 
for European banks not to deleverage too much too soon [Malovic-Marinkovic, 2013]. 
Contemporary OMTs (due to full sterilisation not to be confused with QE) proved to be much more 
effective (pseudo-fiscal)6 measures, although probably untenable and overly expensive in the longer 
run. 
 
3. EBU: Critical appraisal and feasible corrective proposal 
 
Appointed by the European Council according to motion made by the Commission, 
European Banking Authority is the new institution responsible for “vertical transfer” in bank 
regulation as well as in specific tasks concerning macro-prudential aspects of supervision, from 
member states onto the E(M)U jurisdiction, with due regard for the unity and integrity of the Single 
market [Gortsos, 2012]. EBA’s task is to elevate European banking regulation to the level playing 
field, while within the SSM it is to adopt the pan-European capital requirements regulation (CRR) in 
supplementing it by the fourth capital requirements directive (CRD4) previously aligned with Basel 3 
framework [Veron-Wolff, 2013]. Thus, SSM shall implement a harmonized supervisory rulebook 
based on Basel 3 accord primarily for the Eurozone’s banks, although non-Eurozone member states 
are expected and encouraged to enter close cooperation agreements with EBA&ECB and thereby 
effectively make their banks too fully participating members of the SSM. The actual supranational 
supervision is assigned to the ECB, assuming prior erection of the usual and appropriate ‘Chinese 
walls’, in order to legally and practically prop up the separation of monetary policy and price stability 
tasks from its supervisory and LLR duties [Gortsos, 2012]. In carrying out supervisory assignments, 
national authorities will act as the ECB’s executive arm, just as Eurozone’s member state central 
banks belong to the ESCB in the context of single monetary policy. However, when it comes to 
micro-prudential supervision, ECB itself is envisaged to be liable only for credit institutions, financial 
holding companies and financial conglomerates – in other words, E(M)U branches of banks 
incorporated in non-EU countries, leasing, factoring and e-money firms, payments institutions, 
investment firms inclusive hedge funds as well as (re)insurance companies are left out of scope of the 
ECB’s mandate and remain the sole responsibility of relevant national agencies [Ibidem]. As far as 
timeframe for the ECB’s supranational supervisory involvement is concerned, it is supposed to 
commence in three waves: from January 2013, over banks which received or requested state 
aid/rescue, as of July 2013 over ‘systemically important’ credit institutions and from January 2014 
onwards over all remaining banks, holdings or conglomerates. ‘Systemic importance’ of the credit 
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institutions, at that, will be evaluated on the basis of weighted average of their size and the magnitude 
of their cross-border activity within the EMU [Gortsos, 2012]. 
However, pan-European regulation by the EBA and supervisory jurisdiction of the ECB are 
simply not enough for the full-fledged banking union. The role of banks in the Eurozone is crucial. 
According to Wolf (2011), almost entire money balances in the EMU consist of financial 
intermediaries’ liabilities (currency in circulation amounts to only 9% of M3). In such a situation, if 
certain big enough banks with potential cross-border repercussions happen to be on a verge of 
collapse, there’s not only a risk of a bank run but also a systemic risk of a run on a national banking 
system.   This is when two other equally important elements of banking union should come into play, 
and namely Eurozone-wide deposit-insurance scheme as well as bank recovery mechanism (the so-
called Single Resolution Mechanism). Nonetheless, this is also where least progress and next to no 
agreement has been made thus far.  
Moreover, it would be dishonest and incorrect to claim that EMU has reached anything 
remotely resembling consensus or focused standpoint in regard to regulation and supervision limbs 
of the EBU either! Strong are the voices asking whether we even need a supranational regulation and 
supervisory authority. Even though SSM intends to flirt with EU-wide extended membership, UK 
and Sweden have made it sobering-clear they were not interested in joining it at all. Nevertheless, we 
would argue that Eurozone badly needs (at least partially and in pecking order) centralised regulation 
and supervision institutes for several intrinsic features of its dramatically distorted financial 
landscape. These arguments run as follows, laid out not only to hopefully convince the reader in 
sensibility of the SSM, but also to reveal its weaker links or vague details to date. 
First of all, it is imperative to realize that European banks grew disproportionally and on a 
wrong diet. While, in principle, growing integration of financial markets improves resource allocation, 
lowers prices and enhances international risk-sharing, Buch, Körner and Weigert (2013), Darvas 
(2013) as well as Dombret and Ebner (2013)  rightly claim that European financial sector integration 
has been excessive in at least four distinct aspects. For one, increase in explicitly or implicitly 
guaranteed foreign liabilities of several member countries has exploded beyond their debt-servicing 
capacity (see Table 1 and Figure 1 in the appendix). Two, financial sector integration in the EU has 
predominantly taken the form of debt at the expense of equity finance, although precisely equity 
brings to the table much needed state-contingency and enables ex-ante insurance in Arrow-Debreu 
fashion [Buch-Körner-Weigert, 2013]. Thirdly, non-financial sector in E(M)U depends heavily on 
banks loans at the expense of debentures or commercial paper (see Figure 3), as research shows that 
loan supply played a key role in the European credit (rating) crunch.7 Darvas (2013) maintains that 
exactly for disruptive effect of limited loan supply normal lending in E(M)U hasn’t been restored yet, 
aided only by very slight substitution of receding bank loans with debt securities.  Finally, these debt-
ridden financial claims in EMU exhibited much faster paced growth than trade or GDP, which 
caused not only banks’ alienation from the real economy but also the outpacing of their institutional 
environment [Dombret-Ebner, 2013]. Thus, cross-border activity propelled both the size and the 
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€ of loan growth in 2011, lion’s share at 0.84 trillion € was on the account of interbank lending [Ibidem], a potential 
domino effect which could be effectively tackled only by supranational rules of engagement.  
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extent of financial leverage of European banks (especially those from the EMU’s core, e.g. Germany) 
to unprecedented magnitude, as evident from the Figures 2 and 4  in the appendix. Pan-European 
regulation and supervision is essential in gradual effort of rectifying such trends. 
Next, in spite of certain reversal in cross-border exposure and somewhat fragmented 
financial markets in the EMU as of late, the shortcomings of ‘cherry picking’ national regulatory 
frameworks and weak supervisory standards in national domains (for example insufficient equity on 
banks’ balance sheets, pro-cyclicality of capital requirements, collision of national interests, national 
endowment- or legal definition mismatch8), has enabled a build-up of humungous risks in the 
European banking sector [Buch-Körner-Weigert, 2013]. Furthermore, decisive steps to crisis 
resolution are still being delayed by means of regulatory forbearance due to smelly ties between 
national political leaders and their banks. Even though EMU had so-called Supervisory Colleges ever 
since 2010, as informal fora meant for monitoring and coordination of problematic banks, SSM is 
indeed the first major landmark on the way to full-fledged EBU. But just how impeccable it promises 
to be by the current design?  
SSM has a modern, flexible and all-encompassing shell, albeit with poorly masked absence of 
actual muscle, to put it bluntly. On positive side, strengthening pan-European EBA rules with ECB’s 
access to data and policing instrumentation is a definite step forward. Previous stress-tests simulated 
by national supervisors were not diligent enough and consequently convinced nobody. The ECB, 
however, will undertake an “asset quality review” before it officially assumes the role of the 
Eurozone banking supervisor next year, with good odds for lifting the cloud of suspicion in regard to 
the health of EMU’s banks [The Economist, 2013]. In addition, speaking of ECB, we disagree with 
number of authors that supervisory function ought to be completely independent from the ECB: a) 
diverging EBA’s supervisory standards from the ECB’s supervisory powers on the ground simply 
won’t happen if supervisors in Frankfurt honour the subsidiarity principle, focusing themselves on 
the most systemically important cross-border institutions while delegating the operative supervision 
of smaller ones back to competent and regulatory harmonized national authorities under their 
command.  Striking a wise compromise along those lines offers a triple pay-off: smaller perimeter of 
pan-European supervision relaxes the scope of mutualized resolution, keeps newly created ECB’s 
supervisory arm within its depth and –as observed by Gros and Schoenmaker (2012, p.5)- avoids 
political resistance to denying “thousands of small(er) banks from the area of influence of national 
authorities which might actually be better placed to monitor them” anyway; b) similarly, objections 
that ECB officials would be preoccupied with monetary policy and price stability objectives, in other 
words, reluctant to blow the whistle over “bigger picture”, “peace in the house” etc. could be just as 
easily confronted with historical incidents of independent supervisory agencies having been all too 
trigger-happy or timing-clumsy in foreclosing the banks.  On the negative side, even SSM is being put 
together frustratingly slow and being stuffed with often blurry filling in respect to fine difference 
between drafted and (f)actual.  For example, one still stumbles over announcements that ECB is 
capable of and is going to supervise all 6000 (EMU)-8000 (EU) credit institutions and/or foreign 
subsidiaries in the E(M)U. What’s more, the fact that leading members of EMU secretively passed 
special legislation aiming to exempt their systemically important banks from the outreach of EBA 
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and consequently SRM (in the making), only hours after reaching consensus on its establishment,  
doesn’t help either clarity or credibility of the EBU under construction. In addition, SSM should be 
further supported by prudential bylaws along the lines of Glass-Steagall, Volcker rule or demarcation 
suggested by the Vickers’ commission in the UK. Last but not least, once systemic importance and 
contagion capacity is reliably quantified within pecking order, peer-reviewed supervisory system, SSM 
ought to introduce the approaches that seek to internalise the negative externalities caused by too-
systemic-to-fail banks, e.g. Dombret and Ebner (2013) suggest special capital surcharges and/or 
Pigouvian steering taxes. Ideally, those surcharges should fully cover specific bank’s risk increment to 
the VaR of the whole EBU. Lastly, certain areas of regulation have been deliberately omitted from or 
pulled out of the EBA rulebook and passed onto the resolution segment of the EBU precisely 
because there is a bitter disagreement on the endgame drill when it comes to winding down or 
outright liquidating failing banks.  
That said, we firmly subscribe to Veron’s and Wolff’s (2013) principle according to which 
EBU and SSM should entail a mechanism for risk-sharing, not loss-sharing. Hence, improved version 
of EBA and ECB’s supervisory rulebook in coordination with SRM legislation must take an 
irrevocable step towards swifter ability and readiness to impose losses on banks’ creditors including 
senior unsecured ones. In other words, without endgame ammo, provided by the recovery and 
resolution mechanism, regulation and supervision amount to no more than an empty threat. 
Ironically, even in such a disabled beta version, SSM probably won’t be up and running before 
summer 2014. Once again, it makes one wonder whether EMU members are seriously building a raft, 
actually waiting for the flood to eventually evaporate on its own, or rather secretly providing for the 
(individual) one way ground transportation. Nevertheless, before unwrapping the Pandora’s Box of 
developments and controversies in this regard, let us study the urgency, financial scope and political 
willingness for the installment of first aid cupboard in every banking union – its mutual deposit 
insurance scheme.  
Deposit insurance in contemporary E(M)U is provided via variety of national deposit 
guarantee funds, with some countries (like Austria and Germany) relying on more than one local 
scheme simultaneously. Some mandatory schemes are enhanced by voluntary ones, some provide for 
more than mere deposit insurance (German Sparkassen scheme extends to total liabilities’ 
mutualisation too), but almost all of national deposit guarantee schemes reveal having access to 
strikingly miniscule prepaid funds relative to the amount assumed by covered deposits, possibly the 
best illustration of messy divergence in EBU’s deposit funding standards [IMF, 2013].9 And yet Vice-
President of the ECB not long ago confirmed that common deposit insurance in the EMU if at all 
isn’t required any time soon [Gros, 2013*]. Despite the fact that 19 year old process of harmonisation 
of European deposit guarantee schemes (DGS) speeded itself up after the collapse of Lehman, 
resulting in aligned minimum deposit protection and maximum payout periods, further convergence 
let alone mutualisation of DGS has been recently suspended10, pending upon adoption of the EMU-
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 Divergence in DGSs’ nominal capacity relative to respective GDPs is illustrated in the Figure 5 of the appendix.  
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 European Parliament backed Commission’s target of 1.5% of deposits covered as a multiyear target for an ex ante 
fund, whereas EU Council didn’t agree on anything over 0.5% for Eurozone’s DGS [Gros-Schoenmaker, 2012]. The 
irony of it all is that even a bigger of the two (1.5% of deposits covered) could plug the damage equivalent to only about 
one big omnipresent Euroland bank or perhaps three smaller ones, caeteris paribus, which is ridiculous as compared to the 
perfect storm which may besiege the Eurozone if it remains mired on a sticky wicket. Therefore, EBU in all likelihood 
cannot solve the legacy assets problem without additional fiscal backstop, but back-of-the-envelope calculus performed 
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wide recovery and resolution mechanism through a new directive (see Table 2 in the appendix). Part 
of the objection is that retail deposits are immobile (but alas assets and other liabilities are!) and that 
each sovereign is equally strong (yet country specific shocks could plague national banking system 
triggered by big cross-border active banks from abroad). This truth is obviously politically sensitive 
on both macroeconomic and financial system level. First of all, it is a misconception that any 
checkable deposit below guaranteed sum is fully safe, always recoverable and as good as cash: it in 
fact constitutes a credit recoverable in full only under narrow banking paradigm [Mayer, 2013]. 
Second of all, in a monetary union with free capital flows (at least when it comes to legacy assets 
which turned soar) financial aspects of national boom-bust cycles could have either international 
origins or international repercussions, or both really. Put differently, systemic risk doesn’t stop at 
national borders hence national debt insurance funds may prove insufficient to keep depositor losses 
at politically acceptable and pre-obliged bay, moreover, specific international making of banking 
failures can sometimes imply unfairness by mopping them up solely out of national purse.  
It is quite another, formidably complex, matter to advise just how Eurozone’s DGS ought to 
be designed and where from. Notwithstanding the fact it’s increasingly uncomfortable that banks are 
nationally supervised, while they expand their balance sheets (as well as risk-taking) internationally, 
there’s neither money nor political will for fully federalised DGS, much less for mutualisation of all 
the bank debt/likely bank losses across the Eurozone [Malovic-Marinkovic, 2013]. Of course, that 
hopefully may not be quite so necessary: at the end of the day, in all but the most extreme events 
disbursement of deposit insurance is a liquidity- rather than solvency problem. Sure thing, one can 
never overestimate the danger of excessive and covert financial leverage back-firing, but consolidated 
balance sheet of the Eurozone’s banks computes liabilities of 27 trillion € of which only a third 
represent deposits belonging to households and non-financial institutions, meaning that if depositors 
remain super-senior only very gigantic losses could threaten them and activate (inter)national safety 
nets [Gros, 2013*].11 Still, low fungibility in the face of adversity, high importance of timeliness in 
deposit insurance disbursement and a sorry state of financial affairs across EMU’s national DGSs, 
call for several pieces of policy advice. 1) If one takes recently published datum of 51,000€ worth of 
property in possession of an average German person as the EMU-wide yardstick, it becomes patently 
obvious that 50K per head (especially if per bank) is high-enough and more realistically affordable 
deposit guarantee. 2) Eurozone’s DGS, regardless of its final shape and form, should be separated 
from resolution and recovery fund on moral hazard grounds (on behalf of both bank(st)ers and 
crony politicians), just as the absence of adequately beefed up DGS would again invoke moral hazard 
(absent any deposit insurance bank(st)ers would bet on the bailout with the highest likelihood). 3) 
Legacy assets ought to be dealt with simultaneously yet independently from DGS, whatever 
mechanism EMU ended up choosing. In closing this inherited gap there might have to be at least 
symbolic federalization of losses and/or mutual long-term borrowing across national DGS, bearing 
in mind that losses were made in monetary union and to the extent because of common currency, 
whereas house-cleaning and building up deposit insurance fund(s) would further weaken already 
shaken profitability of European banks [Malovic-Marinkovic, 2012, p.6], [IMF, 2013, p.5] 4) DGS 
premiums should properly reflect risks involved whilst EMU-wide DGS ought to be mandatory. 5) 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
by Gros and Schoenmaker (2012, p.11) does point out the benefits of pooling, because currently no national DGS on its 
own could cope with the failure of even single one of Eurozone’s megabanks. 
11
 Interestingly, even in most enflamed and crisis-stricken GIIPS region, proportion robustly holds, with 1 trillion worth 
covered deposits against 7 trillion assets which risk-weighted amount to just under 3 trillion € collateral [Ibidem]  
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We see only two theoretically viable strategies for launching mutual deposit insurance fund that could 
pass the number-crunching test: slightly modified Mayer’s (2013*) narrow banking proposal and 
gradual reinsurance or coinsurance mechanism put forward by the EU Commission, Gros and 
Schoenmaker (2012) and Gros (2013*).12  
Copernican twist adapted from Mayer (2013*) assumes prescribing compulsory 100% 
reserve requirement (provided by central bank reserve money) for covered deposits fraction of 
deposit potential, thereby dealing with DGS first, SRM immediately after and with SSM at the very 
end of the EBU-creation process. Reserve holdings would be electronically created by LLR facility 
and deposited with the ECB (perhaps for a fee payable by banks and/or their depositors). No 
industry or national DGS would be necessary.  Positive aspects of the proposal include better 
control- of book money creation and therefore over asset bubbles formation, substantial retirement 
of sovereign debt via consolidating government-bank claims through reserve money issuance as well 
as decrease of sovereign’s interest costs [Mayer, 2013]. Less clear are the overall inflationary 
consequences of tapping the safety net and growth effects of reduced financial intermediation. 
On the other hand, more down-to-the-earth proposal stresses the benefits of Pan-Eurozone 
risk sharing phased in either as reinsurance or coinsurance multilateral safety net. However, Gros’s 
and Schoemaker’s (2012) proposal to concentrate a mutual DSG on 70 or so largest EMU banks 
doesn’t make too much sense. The ECB can indeed usurp supervisory powers from national agencies 
pretty rapidly should the anamnesis so require, but national versus EMU-wide DGS checkpoint 
cannot be a posteriori efficiently or credibly slidden, neither in respect to bank population charged nor 
in terms of altering the rules of fund engagement.13 Hence, mutual coinsurance fund of prepaid 1.5% 
deposits covered on pan-Eurozone level (some 6,000 banks) as a safety valve on a top of existing 
national DGS consoles is in order, followed by need-be additional 0.5% ex post levies earmarked by 
the Commission [Gros, 2013*]. Gros and Schoenmaker (2012, p.10) found some 4.2 trillion € of 
covered deposits for all Eurozone banks under 100,000 € guaranteed, implying that some 60 billion € 
would have to be collected in the common pool to enact the first line of the EBU’s defense. We 
venture to guess that with 50,000 € guarantee that number would drop to about 40 billion €. 
Preferably, in the first 5 years of EBU’s existence all the levies should go in the common pool, 
whereas later on contribution to national DGSs could be filled up in accordance with degree of 
systemic risk still around and extent of cross-border activity of every individual bank. In the 
meanwhile double payment premia may be allowed or avoided depending on severity of liquidity 
squeeze perhaps even on a country by country case, but definitely not on a bank by bank case! 
Needless to say, common DGS premia ought to be compulsory in full amount over initial 5-year 
interval. After 5 years, European bank could contribute only 80% to a local failure, while purely 
national/local banks would be liable the full 100% to a national DGS as in Gros and Schoenmaker 
(2012). Finally, redemptions from the common DGS should wisely replicate private reinsurance 
contracts, contracts that typically provide for deep deductibles as an incentive compatible mechanism 
                                                          
12
 Eclectic proposal put forward by Suarez (2012) falls somewhere in between the two basic ones already mentioned, and 
provides for possibly smooth transition from Gros’s (2013*) and Gros’s and Schoenmaker’s (2012) to Mayer’s (2013*) 
blueprint. 
13
 After all, history tells us that banking crises do not usually originate with the largest banks, but often with smaller fast 
expanding institutions that have a motive to offload assets into off-balance sheet SPVs or to split it in smaller units so to 
slip under the ECB’s regulatory radar [Münchau, 2012]. 
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that would surely prevent national authorities from engaging in morally hazardous policies. In other 
words, Eurozone’s DGS should as a rule pay only after national DGS resources were appropriately 
tapped (where appropriately must be algebraically predefined) and in cases where losses are 
particularly large or of systemic international origin [Gros, 2013*]. 
 At last, the third extremity of every banking union, common recovery and resolution 
authority, in EBU’s case don’t seem to have anything in common with one another, suggesting to 
even rather superficial analyst that we are actually faced with “Separate Resolution Mechanisms”. 
However, allowing for orderly restructuring and resolution of zombified European banks is of 
absolutely vital importance in breaking the bailout expectations among institutions that would 
otherwise indefinitely remain too-systemic-to-fail [Dombret-Ebner, 2013]! Therefore, the newest 
ECOFIN’s call -to banks in the EMU to amass minimum loss-absorbing cushion in own equity and 
eligible liabilities (MREL)-undoubtedly deserves a warm welcome [Gros, 2013*]. In addition, 
depositors should be granted a clear priority over senior unsecured bondholders and alike private 
creditors. However, all the bail-in mechanisms and mere hints at central burden sharing authority (i.e. 
for allocating losses) were postponed for 2018 in the previous directive, which owing to stubbornly 
persistant opposition by Germany almost certainly leaves us with loose cooperation among biased 
national authorities and a flimsy backstop for months if not years to come [Veron-Wollf, 2013], [The 
Economist, 2013]. Truth be told, even a more thorough harmonization of national bank insolvency 
regimes will/would take more time than envisaged for the creation of the SRM, which reiterates the 
dilemma about genuine readiness for EBU creation and real longer term agendas that most influential 
EMU members may or may not have. 
Moreover, Johnson (2013) warns against disunity in cross-border resolution but also against 
top 6-ish Eurozone’s megabanks (see Table 3 in the appendix) as a clear and resilient threat even for 
potentially pan-European SRM and the federal(ised) fiscal backstop. National politicians do not want 
to compromise their power and material influence; governments don’t want their hands 
supranationally tied when deciding how to best protect the interest of their electorate, unless the 
source of power is completely removed upwards. But even Eurocrats faced with cross-border banks 
of gigantic size will be unable to tolerate their failure. That implicit subsidy and scale&scope 
economies which allow them to borrow more cheaply further increase the amount of risk they take 
up, thereby reinforcing their too-systemic-to-fail status [Johnson, 2013]. Consequently, SRM should 
carefully examine firewall solutions drafted in Basel 3, Dodd-Frank Act for the US as well as ICB- or 
Vickers’ Report in UK, in order to put a non-disruptive but precautionary cap on the size of the 
biggest financial firms.  
Instead, single resolution authority should be erected as powerful, independent, rapid 
decision making body which would expediently deal with failing banks by either: closing them down 
and liquidating leftovers (with lateral deposit pay-off), mediating a take-over or providing direct 
public support [Gros-Schoenmaker, 2012]. Banks that fall short of EBA’s stress tests but appear to 
be solvent ought to be recapitalized by fresh equity from private investors, by bailing in their 
creditors and only as a last resort by pouring in taxpayers’ money [The Economist, 2013]. Obviously, 
it goes without saying that there could be no SRM or even smoothly operating system of 
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harmonized14 national banking resolution authorities without credible, clearly defined and properly 
funded fiscal backstop(s). Different fiscal backstops and political gridlock surrounding them are 
given due consideration in the next section of the paper. 
4. Fiscal backstop and political gridlock 
  Under current circumstances, it is safe to say that EBU does not quite exist as yet; in 
addition it doesn’t enjoy support of a serious and credible fiscal backstop either, although having one 
now would probably come closest to flagrant dissipation in exchange for a little time.15 For ethical 
and financial credibility reasons, having a SRM would earn a preference, but be that as it may, one 
thing is for sure: there could be no effective resolution mechanism and anti-bailout mentality without 
independent and abundant mutual deposit insurance scheme.   
 In addition, if it played its cards wisely, EMU shouldn’t need gargantuan fiscal backstop for 
the banking union as such. EBU aside, Brussels’s official response to the Eurozone crisis so far has 
been enforcing the fiscal compact as well as forming and subsequent beefing up of the ESM (former 
EFSF). ESM cannot be a suitable fiscal match for Eurozone’s banking problems for at least five 
reasons. First, ESM funds are urgently needed elsewhere, because if EU fails in saving its over-
indebted sovereigns and the common currency there’d be no EBU to dwell on. Second, ESM (or 
rather EFSF), despite German arm-twisting insistence on misusing it every now and then as the bank 
redemption fund, was originally set up as a rescue fund focused on sovereign debt stabilisation. This 
in turn provokes two additional observations. Thirdly, ESM hasn’t got even remotely enough 
monetary power to vouch for the likely size of Eurozone’s banks resolution.16 Fourth, bailing out 
banks is almost always considerably more expensive from bailing out sovereigns. The losses to be 
covered could be huge. The total debt of banks located in the six countries most damaged by the 
crisis (GIIPS + Cyprus) amounts to €9.4tn. The combined government debt of these countries 
stands at €3.5tn. Even if a relatively small fraction of this bank debt were to turn into losses, these 
would be a huge blow to the ESM's loss-bearing capacity [Sinn-Hau, 2013].  
 Quite to the contrary, the use of public money in the whole banking mess clean-up should 
be kept at the minimum. Public money, if all other forms of financing were exhausted, should never 
ever be spent on loss-absorption, but exclusively on technical aspects of restructuring process and in 
providing capital for a new bank possibly emerging from the resolution [Carmassi-Di Noia-Micossi, 
2012].17 Reintroducing market discipline and stronger support to development and prominence of 
equity-based securities in Europe would be of tremendous help for EMU in the medium run. As a 
matter of fact, if our back of the envelope calculus is on track, bailing in policies could provide most 
                                                          
14
 Minimum harmonisation is imperative to rule out the incidence of financial burden being borne by taxpayers in one 
member country potentially arising from too lax a regulation in another member country [Dombret-Ebner, 2013]. 
15
 And according to Wyplosz (2012), when European politicians ask for more time, they want to kill the project. 
16
 ESM’s capital to the tune of 500 billion €, much less some 60 billion cap for direct recapitalization of banks, is hardly a 
match for 2,5 trillion € needed in the short run to meet more stringent EBA’s capital requirements. The entire ESM 
money, indeed looks like humming bird when compared with the size of Eurozone’s banking sector (34 trillion € or 
360% of EMU’s GDP).  
17
 Regretably, Commission’s text leaves too much ambiguity and discretion pockets for resolution authorities when 
undertaking corrective action [Ibidem]. 
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of the threshold money for joint DGS (from private sources) as well.18 However, reasonably 
generous fiscal backstop is needed on a macroeconomic front if we are to save the euro and 
monetary union in its current size and unclog sclerotic financial intermediation in the Euroland. After 
all, by repairing public finances in the Eurozone, policymakers would more or less automatically and 
in any case evasively restore many of those banks whose only ‘sin’ was that at some point they 
became, one way or the other, reckless buyers of the last resort of their national sovereign debt. 
 As explained in detail by Malovic and Marinkovic (2013), we don’t see the viable alternative 
to Eurozone’s a la Brady bonds for a job of reducing bank creditworthiness dependence on the 
respective national sovereign’s credit quality. Eurozone’s Brady bonds would constitute a transfer of 
tranches and elimination of prohibitively high interest rates without any giant macroeconomic bailout 
or nominal debt forgiveness by means of basically providing a federal quasi-fiscal guarantee which 
would probably never be called upon. As eloquently written by Soros (2013), guarantees have a 
peculiar character: the more convincing they are, the less likely are they to be activated. European 
Brady bonds, sure enough, won’t solve the competitiveness gap, meanwhile considerably closed by 
other policy tools, and should be further strengthened by euro’s real depreciation, EIB interventions 
and price cum wage adjustment mechanism along the core-periphery axis. However, ECB issued 
bonds19 would not only ease up the financial markets, resume the bank lending and recover critical 
asset classes practically overnight; it would also enable repackaging of such upgraded debt fitting for 
hedge funds’, non-EU banks’ and alike appetite, thereby effectively achieving quantitative easing, but 
at the expense of global investors, rather than the union’s taxpayers. Thus, Soros (2013) is correct in 
saying that if Germany is opposed to Eurobonds, she has no right to nor it should deter the others 
from introducing them anyway.20 
 With both political and fiscal consideration, we can have more or less Europe, but we cannot 
perpetuate status quo.  Enhanced economic integration is feasible even after dismantling the common 
currency; in fact it may actually improve upon. For more EMU, fair degree of fiscal federalism is 
inevitable, featuring quasi-fiscal transfers, cross-subsidisation and EBU. To that end, Eurozone’s 
economies would have to swallow more reform, much more deregulation, greater unification and less 
austerity. For lesser or no EMU, their members could give up common currency and/or downsize 
Union to more manageable one or two truly optimum currency area(s). That way, notwithstanding 
considerable drawbacks and formidable technicalities in execution of any of the ejections, we may 
end up with one or more banking unions too.  
 Eurozone’s version of impossible trinity, caeteris paribus, claims that keeping common 
currency, Germany and GIIPS in the EMU cannot hold together for too long. EBU version of policy 
trilemma, similarly, spells that one cannot simultaneously sustain internal (or single) credit market, 
national regulatory cum supervisory jurisdictions and pan-European financial stability. One of the 
three must be laid off, and however improbable and catastrophic each possibility looks today, other 
                                                          
18
 Obviously commonly collected threshold would not be sufficient if it comes to the worst - cascading banks runs and 
total financial meltdown, in which case joint DGS might need to have recourse to some ‘federal’ fiscal backstop. 
German dismissal of joint DGS is putting not only EBU but also EMU in serious jeopardy.   
19
 Perhaps they could be issued by the ESM, but ultimately would have to be guaranteed by the ECB, for LLR reasons 
elaborated in Wyplosz (2012). 
20
 Brady bonds issued by the currency union that excludes Germany would still compare favourably with those of the 
U.S., UK and Japan. The net debt of these three countries as a proportion of their GDP is actually higher than that of 
the ‘Eurozone’ excluding Germany [Ibidem]. 
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things equal, one impossibility shall happen. And soon! European policies towards the Eurozone 
crisis so far, apart from Draghi’s OMT as a brief relief, have largely made matters worse. Without 
Eurobonds, credible full-fledged EBU and controllable megabanks’ size, risk exposure-austerity-
depression-unemployment-bankruptcy spiral shall backfire in Germany herself. Therefore, 
immediately after German elections in September, more meaningful and highly informative fiscal 
backstops should appear on the horizon. Without beating around the bush, we shall have either 
proper EBU or none at all. 
5. Conclusion 
Unless the current political gridlock is a temporary outcome of German electoral arithmetic, 
EBU is essentially buried alive and amounts to no more than a pure deception.  
Pernicious link between deteriorating public finances and heavily exposed national banks is 
not and cannot be broken without full-fledged and therefore risk-sharing EBU, which is supposed to 
rest on all three pillars: single rule-making and supervisory mechanism, common deposit insurance 
scheme as well as single resolution authority. We are currently lacking two of the aforementioned 
three. The question of legacy-assets in troubled banks remains unresolved too. Be that as it may, 
EBU on its own couldn’t solve the Eurozone crisis even if were alive and well, since it is by its very 
definition a longer term project, rather than a fire-fighting vehicle.  
One way or the other, EBU stands no chance whatsoever without further “federalisation” of 
the EMU, although its functional survival may be arranged both with and without Germany’s 
continued participation. If Germany is opposed to EBU and Brady bonds (the latter required for 
exiting currency and sovereign-debt layers of the Eurozone crisis), she has no right to, nor the fact 
should, deter others from introducing them anyway. In other words, EMU needs both the EBU and 
Eurozone’s Brady bonds to draw a final line under its crisis. At the time of this writing, there’s 
neither in sight.  
In the end of the day, we can arguably have both more EMU and less EMU, the former 
associated with giving up common currency or downsizing it to a more manageable, one or more 
truly OCA(s), whereas latter associated with fair degree of fiscal federalism via quasi-fiscal transfers, 
minimal amount of debt mutualisation via EBU and Brady bonds, but we cannot perpetuate this 
status quo! Coming back to banking union blueprint, EBU version of impossible trinity spells out that 
one cannot simultaneously sustain single credit market, national regulation cum supervision and 
stability of pan-European banking industry.  
Hence, immediately after the September elections (in Germany), Eurozone will get either 
well-founded and properly treated EBU or none at all.  
(This paper is a part of research projects 47009 (European integrations and social and economic changes in Serbian 
economy on the way to the EU), financed by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development 
of the Republic of Serbia. The usual disclaimer applies.) 
 
  






Table 1: EMU’s Vitals 
 
Adopted from Danske Bank (2013) 
Figure 1: Foreign liabilities and debt overhang 
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Adopted from Danske Bank (2013) 
 
 
Figure 2: Foreign ownership of banking system assets 
 
 
       Source: Buch, Körner and Weigert (2013) 
 
 
Figure 3: Debt-liabilities of non-financial corporations 1999-2012 
 
Source: Darvas (2013) 
 
 






Figure 4: Size and leverage of the German banking system with accent on systemically important 
financial institutions’ expansion 
 
 
 Source: Dombret and Ebner (2013) 
 
 
Figure 5: Divergence in EMU’s DGSs’ Capacity 
 
             











Table 2:  Characteristics of EU DGSs 2012 
 


















Table 3: Top 25 Banks in the EMU (ranked by assets) 
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